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AMICI CURIAE’S STATEMENT OF INTEREST AND OVERVIEW1
Amici are the children of Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru
Yasui, three American citizens of Japanese ancestry who, as young men during
World War II, challenged the constitutionality of the military orders subjecting
Japanese Americans to curfew and forced removal from the West Coast. Deferring
to the government’s claim of military necessity, and failing to scrutinize the basis
for the government’s actions, the Supreme Court affirmed their criminal
convictions for defying the military orders, placing its stamp of approval on one of
the most sweeping deprivations of constitutional liberties in recent American
history. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
Forty years later, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui successfully reopened
their cases and had their wartime convictions vacated, based on proof that in order
to secure favorable decisions from the Supreme Court, the government had
suppressed, altered, and destroyed military and civilian intelligence directly
refuting its claim that military necessity justified the wartime internment of
Japanese Americans. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406 (N.D.Cal.
1984); Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987), affirming in
part and reversing in part, 627 F.Supp. 1445 (W.D.Wash. 1986); Order, Yasui v.
1

All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Only amici’s counsel authored, or
contributed money for the preparation and submission of, this brief. FRAP 29(c)(5).
1
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United States, Crim. No. C 16056, at 2 (D.Or. Jan. 26, 1984) (granting
government’s motion to vacate conviction and dismissing petition), rev’d and
remanded on other grounds, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985). These men showed
that the internment was far more than an unfortunate “mistake,” as many had
concluded, but was the product of a fundamental and pervasive abuse of power.
The federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, failed to accord the
internment of Japanese Americans the exacting scrutiny the government’s
wholesale deprivation of constitutional liberties demanded. Had it done so, the lack
of bona fide factual justification for the internment–as well as the government’s
fraud on the courts, the Japanese American community, and the nation–would
likely have been revealed. The NDAA’s indefinite detention scheme echoes the
indefinite detention that characterized the internment, and, similarly, it is factually
unsubstantiated as well as ill-defined and overbroad in scope, as Judge Forrest
found.
The threshold issue here is whether this Court will exactingly review the
government’s legal and factual defense of the NDAA’s indefinite detention
provision, as Judge Forrest did, or will instead uncritically defer to the
government’s position, as the Court did in the internment cases. Given the
constitutional liberties at stake here, and in the spirit of their fathers’ defenses of
those same freedoms, amici urge this Court to draw upon the revelations of the
2
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Japanese American internment and coram nobis cases and affirm Judge Forrest’s
application of heightened scrutiny to her review of the NDAA’s indefinite
detention provisions.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
COMPELS CAREFUL JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF GOVERNMENT
NATIONAL SECURITY RESTRICTIONS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES.
In the shadow of America’s expansive war on terror, disagreement persists

about the judiciary’s role in reviewing legal challenges to government national
security actions curtailing fundamental liberties. Some, including former Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, contend the judiciary should play a muted role,
explaining “[t]he laws will...not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a
somewhat different voice.” William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil
Liberties in Wartime 224-25 (2000); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th
Cir. 2003) (the judiciary “has shown great deference to the political branches when
called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of…national security”),
vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Because the government usually can articulate a
facially plausible national security rationale for its actions, this limited approach
inevitably aligns the courts with the political branches even in the face of
government excesses or unsubstantiated claims of necessity.

3
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This deferential approach conflicts with the constitutionally enshrined
principle of government accountability through checks-and-balances. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, careful judicial scrutiny of constitutionally
questionable actions of the political branches is essential to securing the nation as a
democracy. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. 2, 14 (1866) (rejecting government’s argument that the President has wartime
power to serve as “supreme legislator, supreme judge, and supreme executive”);
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008) (“To hold that the political
branches may switch the Constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime in
which they, not this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”). When the judiciary fails to
discharge its constitutional obligation to check the political branches, as in the
WWII internment cases, democracy’s rule of law is threatened. Eric K. Yamamoto,
White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President
Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 285, 327
(2005).
The judiciary’s independent check on the executive and legislative branches
is most important during times of national distress. It is then that the political
branches have too often sacrificed constitutional liberties in the name of national
security, scapegoating innocent individuals and marginalized groups, and then
justifying their actions by dissembling or relying on false or misleading factual
4
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claims. (See Args.II, III.) As Justice Souter explained, the courts act as a vital
check on the government’s penchant to “amplify” its claim of necessity to legally
justify its actions:
[f]or reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance
between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory;
the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that
security legitimately raises. A reasonable balance is more likely to be
reached on the judgment of a different branch [the Judiciary].
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
These judicial checks, rooted in the constitutional separation of powers,2 are
essential because “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it
comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.” Id. at 536. As the Supreme Court
affirmed in closely reviewing executive detention powers after the Civil War, the
“safeguards of liberty” should receive the “watchful care of those [e]ntrusted with
the guardianship of the Constitution and laws”—the courts. Milligan, 71 U.S. at
124. More recently, during the Iraq War, Justice Kennedy reiterated that even in
“extraordinary times…[l]iberty and security can be reconciled; and in our
system…reconciled [by courts] within the framework of the law.” Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 798; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.Supp.2d 527, 532 (E.D.Va. 2002)
2

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293-94 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“separation of
powers was adopted…not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.
The purpose was…to save the people from autocracy. …And protection of the individual…from
the arbitrary or capricious exercise of power was then believed to be an essential of free
government.”).
5
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(quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (“The standard of
judicial inquiry must also recognize that the ‘concept of ‘national defense’ cannot
be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of [government] power designed
to promote such a goal’”), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S.
507 (2004).
The appropriate “standard of judicial inquiry” is determined by a
straightforward principle that balances the government’s need to advance security
with the people’s constitutional civil liberties guarantee:
Except as to actions under civilly-declared martial law, the standard of
judicial review of government restrictions of civil liberties of
Americans is not altered or attenuated by the government's contention
that “military necessity” or “national security” justifies the challenged
restrictions. In operation, this means that the standard of review of
governmental action is to be determined according to the existing
constitutional doctrine which focuses on the right restricted.
Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited - Correcting the Injustice of
Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better
Accommodation of National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 Santa Clara
L.Rev. 1, 41-42 (1986); Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law 805 (3d
ed.2002) (addressing importance of heightened scrutiny “in cases like Hirabayashi
and Korematsu, ‘where there is the most at stake in terms of personal freedom and
the political branches are most likely to over-react’”).

6
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Under established doctrine, the character of the “rights restricted”
determines the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 529-30 (1945) (“the character of the right, not of the limitation…determines
what standard governs the choice” of review); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (actions “against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition…call[ing] for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry”); Aviam Soifer, Law and the Company We Keep 131-33
(1995).
Measures are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny—requiring the
government to carefully delineate those targeted and demonstrate bona fide
necessity—only when they appear to curtail fundamental liberties or involve
suspect classifications like race. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory
of Judicial Review 135-36 (1980). In those instances, keeping in mind the possible
need for confidentiality, a court requires the government to forthrightly and
substantially justify its actions curtailing fundamental liberties. If the government
can do so, its actions are sustained; if it cannot, its actions are invalidated. Exacting
judicial scrutiny thus affords the executive and legislative branches latitude in
undertaking genuinely needed security measures that impinge upon basic liberties
while also preventing (in the specific case) and deterring (in future instances)
government overreaching or dissembling that damages foundational American
7
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values. David Cole & James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution:
Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security 241 (rev. ed. 2006)
(“We subject executive decisions to judicial review…because…the adversarial
process can produce a fuller factual record, exposing faulty assumptions, and
because deliberative review by life-tenured judges can protect against the rash
decisions resulting from the pressures felt by elected officials.”).3
Despite disagreements, courts now correctly recognize the necessity for
meaningful judicial review even (or especially) in the national security context, in
part because the internment cases demonstrated the grave danger of a hands-off
judiciary. (See Arg.III.) Reflecting this trend, Judge Forrest’s decision properly
rejected the government’s argument that judges should “step aside” in these
3

Justice Jackson’s Youngstown analysis of the nature of executive power under the Constitution
is not contrary to amici’s view of the judiciary’s critical role in protecting our fundamental
freedoms. While Jackson posited that Presidential authority is “at its maximum” when authorized
by Congress, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring), this “rough” formulation, id. at 635, is, and must be, tempered by countervailing
principles: that the purpose of the Constitutional diffusion of power is “to secure liberty,” id.;
that the President and Congress must exercise their delegated powers within Constitutional
limits, id. at 640; and that the nature of the “rights restricted” by governmental action, not of the
power exercised, fixes the proper level of judicial scrutiny, see Thomas, 323 U.S. at 529-30. As
the intellectual architect of the Nuremberg war crimes trials, Jackson understood the need for
meaningful judicial review. Having dissented in Korematsu, Jackson would have understood that
the Japanese American internment and coram nobis cases teach that the judiciary’s check on the
political branches through its power of searching review must not be curtailed even when, in
times of national distress, they act together in denying essential freedoms.
Judge Forrest’s decision recognizes these principles: “It is simply not the case that by prefacing
this statute with the provision ‘Congress affirms…the authority of the President…to detain
covered persons…,’ it is outside of the purview of judicial review. If that were the case, it would
reveal an extraordinary loophole through which the legislative and executive branches could
create immunity from judicial oversight[.]” Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839 at *31.
8
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controversies. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012). Citing the historical “embarrassment” of the deferential
Korematsu majority, id. at *5, Judge Forrest instead carefully reviewed the
government’s arguments and evidence on §1021(b)(2) and related issues of
standing and injunctive relief in light of the NDAA’s curtailment of core liberties
of speech and due process. (See Arg.IV.) In doing so she faithfully discharged the
judiciary’s obligation of “watchful care.”
II.

HISTORY TEACHES THAT SEARCHING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
OF GOVERNMENT NATIONAL SECURITY RESTRICTIONS IS
CRUCIAL TO PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES.
History reveals that in times of national distress the government has too

often reacted excessively and, “subtly renounc[ing] their role as constitutional
backstop,” courts have deferred to the political branches, “taking a hands-off
approach in reviewing government national security actions, even where
fundamental liberties are sharply restricted." Eric K. Yamamoto & Susan K.
Serrano, The Loaded Weapon, 27 Amerasia J. 51, 55 (2001). Justice Thurgood
Marshall observed:
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.
The World War II relocation-camp cases, and the Red scare and
McCarthy-era internal subversion cases, are only the most extreme
reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed
in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to
regret it.
9
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Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530 (“history and common sense” reveal “that an
unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for
oppression and abuse”).
For Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, who experienced first-hand the
injustice resulting from a lack of searching judicial scrutiny, the courts’ history of
failures to check excessive government actions is particularly relevant. Indeed, in
an earlier amicus brief, Korematsu recounted the historical “pattern whereby the
executive branch curtails civil liberties much more than necessary during wartime
and seeks to insulate the basis for its actions from any judicial scrutiny,” including
the following dark chapters in American law. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred
Korematsu, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), 2004 WL 103832, at *2.
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were early measures President Adams
deployed to scapegoat political enemies under the guise of patriotism and national
security. See Alien Friends Act, ch.58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Sedition Act of 1798,
ch.73, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (both expired in 1800). With the judiciary's approval,
United States v. Duane, 25 F.Cas. 917 (C.C.Pa. 1801) (No. 14,996); United States
v. Cooper, 25 F.Cas. 631 (C.C.Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865), these Acts enabled the
executive branch to stifle political dissent by detaining political dissenters as
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“dangerous.” James Morton Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition
Laws and American Civil Liberties (1956).
During World War I, under the Espionage Act of 1917 and a “feverish
atmosphere,” the judiciary allowed the government to prosecute wartime dissenters
for their protest speech. Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the
Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U.Chi. L.Rev. 335, 357 (2003).
Deferential courts affirmed many Espionage Act convictions. Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
The Cold War era’s McCarthyism and loyalty oaths destroyed many lives as
the government prosecuted American Communist Party members and scapegoated
alleged “sympathizers.” Tainted often with anti-Semitism and racial prejudice, and
with deferential courts lending their imprimatur, the government trampled
individuals’ constitutional rights of free speech and association under the mantle of
national security. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(upholding Smith Act prosecutions).
This history and the Japanese American internment cases discussed below
illuminate a key insight for the judiciary: when core constitutional liberties are at
stake, courts need to subject government claims of national security necessity to
heightened scrutiny to promote government accountability and foster democratic
checks-and-balances.
11
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THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERNMENT DECISIONS
ILLUSTRATE THE DANGERS OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
NATIONAL SECURITY RESTRICTIONS THAT CURTAIL
FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES.
The Supreme Court’s Japanese American internment cases—particularly

Korematsu—have been cited by judges and scholars to illustrate the need for
careful judicial review during times of national distress.4 These cases, along with
the evidence supporting their reopening in later coram nobis proceedings, illustrate
two stark realities: 1) during time of fear or distress, both the executive and
legislative branches at times bend to the will of “intemperate majorities,” Edward
Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power 63 (1991), and
unfairly target unpopular and relatively powerless groups; and 2) lax judicial
review not only allows or even condones such governmental excess, but invites

4

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 375-76 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (“[C]ourts must be vigilant in guarding Constitutional freedoms, perhaps
never more so than in time of war. We must not forget the lesson of Korematsu[.]”); Fraise v.
Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 530 (3d Cir. 2002) (Rendell, J., dissenting) (citing Korematsu, “[w]e
have, at times, overreacted in response to perceived characteristics of groups thought to be
dangerous to our security” and requiring “close scrutiny” to determine whether group
membership poses a real threat); Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F.Supp.2d 379, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2007),
affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded by John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d
Cir. 2008), modified (Mar. 26, 2009) (citing Korematsu: “The pages of this nation’s
jurisprudence cry out with compelling instances illustrating that…when the judiciary lowers its
guard on the Constitution, it opens the door to far-reaching invasions of liberty."); Farag v.
United States, 587 F.Supp.2d 436, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Korematsu is “now widely regarded as
a black mark on our constitutional jurisprudence”); see also Eugene Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases--A Disaster, 54 Yale L.J. 489, 502-33 (1945); Margaret Chon, Remembering
and Repairing: The Error Before Us, In Our Presence, 8 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 643, 645 (2010);
Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” of
Arab Americans as “Terrorists,” 8 Asian L.J. 1, 12 (2001).
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abuses of power, including in amici’s fathers’ cases a fraud on the courts at the
highest levels.
A.

The Supreme Court’s failure to closely scrutinize the
government’s claims of military necessity for the Japanese
American internment led it to validate one of the most sweeping
deprivations of fundamental liberties in American history.

Americans now know that the Japanese American internment was “not
justified by military necessity”; instead, its “broad historical causes…were race
prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.” U.S. Comm’n on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Congress of 1980, Report:
Personal Justice Denied, at 18 (1982); see 50A U.S.C. §1989a(a). The Court’s
failure to adequately scrutinize the government actions in amici’s father’s cases
validated the notion of racial guilt, with its enduring human cost on the Japanese
American community.
On February 19, 1942, bowing to political and media pressure, both
exploiting and fueled by public fears, id. at 67-82; Roger Daniels, Concentration
Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II 32-34 (1972), President
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, 7 Fed.Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942), which
effectively gave the military sweeping authority over civilians in the name of
national security. Congress made violation of military orders issued under EO
9066 a federal offense. Pub.L.No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942). Using this
authority, Lt. General John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command,
13
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issued orders imposing a curfew on all persons of Japanese ancestry and then
forcibly removing them from their homes and communities. Without any proven
acts of espionage or sabotage, over 110,000 Japanese Americans, two-thirds U.S.
citizens, were interned in concentration camps in harshly desolate areas of the
interior for the duration of the war. Daniels, supra, at 33, 104.
Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu defied the military orders and
challenged the constitutionality of their resulting criminal convictions, and thereby
the internment as a whole, as racist deprivations of fundamental rights. Affirming,
the Supreme Court failed to carefully scrutinize the basis for these orders, but
instead, deferred to Lt.Gen. DeWitt’s ostensible judgment that military necessity
compelled the government’s actions.
Hirabayashi initiated the Court’s troubling path of judicial abdication. After
deciding to address only Hirabayashi’s curfew conviction, the Court explained
that, in reviewing the actions of the war-making branches of government, “it is not
for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or to substitute its
judgment for theirs.” Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85, 93. Further, uncritically
accepting the government’s calculated use of judicial notice, Nanette Dembitz,
Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s
Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 Colum. L.Rev. 175, 185-87 (1945), the Court
failed to require bona fide proof of the government’s claims that the orders were
14
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justified. The “facts” the government asserted and the Court adopted—that the
proximity of Japanese Americans to strategic installations, their “racial
characteristics,” and purported instances of espionage or sabotage created a “real”
threat to national security, Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 95-98— were all controverted.
Improperly taking judicial notice of these disputed “facts,” the Court accepted,
without scrutinizing, the government’s claim of military necessity. Employing a
double-negative, the Court announced that “we cannot reject as unfounded the
judgment” of the military commander and political branches. Id. at 99.
A year-and-a-half later, the Supreme Court decided Korematsu, upholding
the constitutionality of the forcible removal of West Coast Japanese Americans.
323 U.S. at 217-18. While the Court asserted that governmental racial
classifications should be “subject...to the most rigid scrutiny,” the Court again
deferred to the political branches and military, inquiring only whether there was
any basis for disagreeing with the orders, not whether they were based on a
“pressing public necessity,” and accepting carte blanche the government’s
untrustworthy post hoc record, untested by the protections of the adversarial
process. Id. at 216-19. In Korematsu, the Court accepted DeWitt’s Final Report’s
key factual statements, again, without scrutiny. Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(questioning credibility of DeWitt’s report). Ultimately, re-inscribing its highly
deferential posture, the Court explained that, “Here, as in the Hirabayashi
15
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case…‘we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and
of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number
and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.’” Id. at 218.
In separate dissents, three justices condemned the Court’s decision. Notably,
Justice Jackson warned that the Court’s deferential stance posed a far-reaching and
permanent danger:
How does the Court know that these orders have a reasonable basis in
necessity? No evidence whatever on that subject has been taken by
this or any other court. There is sharp controversy as to the credibility
of the DeWitt report. So the Court, having no real evidence before it,
has no choice but to accept General DeWitt's own unsworn, selfserving statement, untested by any cross-examination, that what he
did was reasonable.
Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). In deferring to the government’s claim of
military necessity, he explained, the Court dangerously turned a factually untested
military expedient into constitutional precedent–“a loaded weapon”: “the Court for
all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure
and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need.” Id. at 245-46 (emphasis added).
In short, in the internment cases, the Court abdicated its role as a check on
the excessive exercise of government power, and, in so doing, gave the
government’s racially-based actions the imprimatur of constitutional authority.
16
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The coram nobis proceedings revealed that a deferential Supreme
Court decided Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui based on a
fraudulent evidentiary record, underscoring the importance of
exacting judicial scrutiny.

For 40 years after their Supreme Court decisions, amici’s fathers continued
to believe that the Court’s essential validation of the internment contravened the
nation’s constitutional principles. Many came to view the internment as an
egregious “mistake.” See Rostow, supra at 489 (calling the wartime internment
“mistaken”); Proclamation No. 4417, 41 Fed.Reg. 7741 (Feb. 19, 1976) (President
Ford rescinding EO 9066 and asking that country learn from our “mistakes”).
In 1981-1982, Peter Irons and Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga discovered WWII
government records that proved the internment was not just a “mistake.” Instead,
the government knew its claims that military necessity justified the internment
were false, and deliberately suppressed, altered, and destroyed material evidence
rebutting its claim of military necessity in order to secure favorable judicial rulings
in the internment cases. Peter Irons, Justice at War 347-67 (1983).
In 1983, based on these discoveries, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui
filed petitions for writs of error coram nobis to vacate their wartime convictions,
successfully proving in the two petitions heard on their merits that the
government’s egregious misconduct not only denied them due process, but
effectively validated the mass racial incarceration based on unfounded charges of
treason. Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. 1406; Hirabayashi, 627 F.Supp.1445;
17

Case: 12-3176

Document: 137

Page: 26

12/17/2012

795402

38

Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d 591.5 The Supreme Court’s refusal to probe the
government’s contentions, and its uncritical deference to DeWitt’s ostensible
military judgment, particularly as expressed in his Final Report, enabled this
pervasive fraud.
First, as the government’s records proved, the Final Report submitted to the
Supreme Court had been materially altered to fabricate an acceptable factual
justification for the forced removal and internment. Hirabayashi, 627 F.Supp. at
1456-57. A prior original Final Report, submitted to the War Department in April
1943 while the DOJ was finalizing its Hirabayashi and Yasui briefs, made clear
that DeWitt’s purported military decision had nothing to do with lack of time to
identify potentially disloyal Japanese Americans—the government’s official
rationale adopted by the Supreme Court.6 DeWitt’s decision was based instead on
his view that Japanese Americans were inherently disloyal because of their “ties of
race…and the strong bonds of common tradition, culture and customs…. It was not
that there was insufficient time in which to make such a determination; …a

5

For an extensive examination of the Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Yasui coram nobis
litigations, see Peter Irons, Justice Delayed: The Record of the Japanese American Internment
Cases 3-46 (1989); Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights and Reparation: Law and the Japanese
Internment 277-387 (2001).
6

See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24 (Korematsu “was excluded [from the Military
Area]…because [the properly constituted military authorities] decided that the military urgency
of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West
Coast temporarily.... There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military
authorities considered the need for action was great, and the time was short.”).
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positive determination could not be made, [and] an exact separation of the ‘sheep
from the goats’ was unfeasible.” Hirabayashi, 627 F.Supp. at 1449 (quoting
DeWitt’s original Final Report). Alarmed, the War Department withheld the Final
Report from the DOJ during Hirabayashi, forced DeWitt to change his report to
recite the official “lack of time” rationale, ordered all copies of the original Final
Report burned, and in Korematsu submitted the altered Final Report to the DOJ
and Supreme Court as DeWitt’s military justification for his orders. Id. at 1450-51.
Given this calculated fraud, the Supreme Court’s uncritical deference to the
military commander’s purported judgment could not have been more prejudicial.
Second, the coram nobis courts also found that the War Department and
DOJ knowingly withheld from the Supreme Court critically reliable evidence
rebutting DeWitt’s factual statements that Japanese Americans were involved in
espionage and sabotage. The government suppressed a definitive report from the
Office of Naval Intelligence, the agency charged with monitoring the Japanese
American communities, which had found that Japanese Americans were
overwhelmingly loyal to the U.S. and posed no security risk and that a mass
incarceration was unnecessary. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 601. In April 1943, DOJ
lawyer Edward Ennis strongly urged Solicitor General Charles Fahy to advise the
Supreme Court in Hirabayashi and Yasui of the ONI report:

19
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I think we should consider very carefully whether we do not have a
duty to advise the Court of the existence of the Ringle memorandum
and of the fact that his represents the view of the Office of Naval
Intelligence. It occurs to me that any other course of conduct might
approximate the suppression of evidence.
Id. at 602 n.11 (emphasis added). The Solicitor General ignored Ennis’s warning,
enabling the Court in the later Korematsu appeal to take judicial notice of
purportedly uncontroverted “facts” that were actually sharply refuted.
The DOJ similarly suppressed FBI and FCC records definitively discrediting
the reports of Japanese American espionage and sabotage, including shore-to-ship
signaling cited in DeWitt’s Final Report. Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1417;
Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 603 n.12; Irons, Justice at War at 280-92. DOJ lawyer
John Burling sought to disclaim reliance on the Final Report through a footnote in
the government’s brief alerting the Supreme Court of the refutory intelligence
reports, but at the War Department’s insistence, the disclaimer was watered down
to virtual non-existence. Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1417-18; Hirabayashi, 828
F.2d at 603 n.12. Ennis also unsuccessfully urged the Solicitor General to disclose
the Final Report’s unreliability, charging that the ONI, FBI, and FCC reports
showed that the allegations of Japanese American espionage and disloyalty were
not just “untrue,” but were “lies, put out in an official publication” that could not
be allowed to “go uncorrected.” In language prophetically underscoring the need
for searching judicial review, Ennis warned: “If we fail to act forthrightly…, the
20

Case: 12-3176

Document: 137

Page: 29

12/17/2012

795402

38

whole historical records of this matter will be as the military choose to state it.”
Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1423.
Lastly, although the Final Report had been thoroughly discredited, Solicitor
General Fahy unequivocally warranted its reliability to the Supreme Court in oral
argument, Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 600, stating: “not only the military judgment of
the general, but the judgment of the Government of the United States, has always
been in justification of the measures taken; and no person in any responsible
position has ever taken a contrary position, and the Government does not do so
now.” Transcript of Proceedings before the Supreme Court, Oct. 12, 1944, at 7,
Korematsu v. United States Coram Nobis Litigation Collection Number 545, Box
25, Folder 5, Dept. of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library,
UCLA (emphasis added). Astonishingly, in response to direct questioning, Fahy
continued to unqualifiedly vouch for the Final Report’s reliability: “there is not a
single line, a single word, or a single syllable in that report which in any way
justifies the statement that General DeWitt did not believe he had, and did not
have, a sufficient basis, in honesty and good faith, to believe that the measures
which he took were required as a military necessity in protection of the West
Coast,” and “[w]e say that the report proves the basis for the exclusion orders.
There is not a line in it that can be taken in any other way. It is a complete
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justification and explanation of the reasons which led to [DeWitt’s] judgment.” Id.
at 6-7, 9-10.7
The government’s fabrication of the record presented to the Supreme Court
highlights the danger of uncritical judicial deference to government national
security claims. As Judge Voorhees explained: “The central issue before the
Supreme Court…was whether exclusion was in fact required by military necessity.
Nothing would have been more important…than to know just why it was that
General DeWitt made the decision that he did.” Hirabayashi, 627 F.Supp. at 1456.
More generally, and quite relevant here, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel emphasized that
all public institutions, including the judiciary, must vigilantly protect
“constitutional guarantees,” especially during perceived crises:
Korematsu remains on the pages of our legal and political history. As
a legal precedent it is now recognized as having very limited
application. As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution that
in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be
vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution
that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national
security must not be used to protect governmental actions from close
scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a caution that in times of
international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative,
executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to
protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that are so
easily aroused.
7

Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal recently acknowledged the injustice of his predecessor’s
failure to truthfully present these cases to the Supreme Court. Confession of Error: The Solicitor
General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, The Justice Blog,
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/ archives/1346 (May 20, 2011).
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Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1420 (emphasis added).
C.

The lessons of the internment civil liberties “disaster”
demonstrate the importance of heightened judicial scrutiny of
government national security measures curtailing fundamental
liberties.

Amici ask this Court, and the judiciary as a whole, to recognize the lessons
of history and the critical importance of the courts in carefully scrutinizing
government national security claims to assure timely protection of constitutional
liberties.
First, it is precisely during times of national stress that the government has
too often targeted vulnerable individuals and groups, denying their fundamental
rights and liberties. These measures are commonly "part of a much larger picture"
of government and public oppression of unpopular and vulnerable groups.8 Undue
judicial deference enables such injustice: “national security crises coupled with
racism or nativism and backed by the force of law generate deep and lasting social
injustice," damaging American democracy. Yamamoto & Serrano, supra at 57.
Second, even intelligent, educated, and well-intentioned decision-makers at
times succumb to human frailties and the corrupting influences of power during
times of national stress. Heated public emotion may cloud judgment, and, as the
8

Yamamoto, White (House) Lies, supra, at 327. See also Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt,
Walking While Muslim, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215, 238 (2005) (exploring “terrorprofiling”: “the selectively negative treatment…of individuals or groups thought to be associated
with terrorist activity, based on race, ethnicity, national origin and/or religion”); Saito,
Symbolism Under Siege, supra, at 12 (America has “raced” those of Arab ancestry as
“‘terrorists’: foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening”).
23

Case: 12-3176

Document: 137

Page: 32

12/17/2012

795402

38

coram nobis cases show, power exercised during a perceived crisis may invite its
own abuse, leading some to dissemble or even fabricate justifications for actions
taken. Many involved in the internment later regretted their actions. Former Chief
Justice Earl Warren, who as California Attorney General vigorously advocated the
removal of West Coast Japanese Americans, wrote:
I have since deeply regretted the removal order and my own testimony
advocating it, because it was not in keeping with our American
concept of freedom and the rights of citizens.... It was wrong to react
so impulsively, without positive evidence of disloyalty, even though
we felt we had a good motive in the security of our state. It
demonstrates the cruelty of war when fear, get-tough military
psychology, propaganda, and racial antagonism combine with one's
responsibility for public security to produce such acts.
Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 149 (1977).
Finally, searching judicial review is critical where, as under the NDAA,
military authorities are granted unfettered indefinite detention discretion. During
WWII, President Roosevelt essentially issued the military a “blank check.”
DeWitt’s orders based on this limitless grant, to which the Court uncritically
deferred, culminated in the internment. In reviewing the NDAA’s new detention
provision, the courts cannot afford to mimic the wartime Supreme Court’s failure.
As the Court has recently confirmed: “Within the Constitution's separation-ofpowers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary
as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to
imprison a person.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797.
24
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Here, Judge Forrest correctly rejected the government’s suggestion that she
uncritically defer to its claims. Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839 at *4, *28-33. By
upholding Judge Forrest’s searching review of the government’s defense of the
NDAA’s virtually limitless detention authority, this Court can affirm the
importance of the judiciary’s independent check on governmental actions
curtailing fundamental liberties in the name of national security.
IV.

JUDGE FORREST APPROPRIATELY DISCHARGED THE
JUDICIARY’S OBLIGATION OF “WATCHFUL CARE.”
Judge Forrest exactingly scrutinized §1021(b)(2), the government’s

arguments, and the factual record, and, in so doing, properly discharged the
judiciary’s role as an independent check on governmental restrictions of
fundamental liberties.
First, she correctly rejected the Government’s argument that she should
“essentially ‘stay out of it,’—that is, exercise deference to the executive and
legislative branches[.]” Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *4. While acknowledging
that courts “owe the political branches a great deal of deference in the area of
national security[,]” she recognized that where “core constitutional rights” are
implicated, “[h]eedlessly to refuse to hear constitutional challenges to the
Executive’s conduct in the name of deference would be to abdicate this Court’s
responsibility to safeguard the rights it has sworn to uphold.” Id. Citing Korematsu
to underscore the dangers flowing from improperly lax judicial oversight, Judge
25
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Forrest explained: “Presented, as this Court is, with unavoidable constitutional
questions, it declines to step aside.” Id. at *5.9 She also drew upon Justice Scalia’s
affirmation of the importance of checks-and-balances, even during wartime: “The
proposition that the Executive lacks indefinite wartime detention authority over
citizens is consistent with the Founders' general mistrust of military power
permanently at the Executive's disposal.” Id. at *20 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at
568 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Second, Judge Forrest correctly rejected the government’s position that “the
Court’s role should be limited to a post-detention habeas review.” Id. at *5. “The
Government argues that the judiciary should play no role here—or, at most, an ex
post facto one in which it reviews habeas petitions challenging detention
determinations.” Id. at *28. Judge Forrest warned that innocent persons could be
imprisoned for years if judicial review were limited to post-detention proceedings.
Id. at *5, *31. That danger is real. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 285 (1944) (three
years for Supreme Court to grant Endo’s habeas corpus challenge to her

9

Justice Murphy’s and Justice Jackson’s dissents also provided guidance to Judge Forrest’s
exacting scrutiny: “In Justice Murphy's Korematsu dissent, he reiterated the principle that
‘[w]hat are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been
overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.’ Justice Jackson also dissented in
Korematsu, stating, ‘I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to enforce an order which
violates constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable exercise of military authority. The
courts can exercise only the judicial power, can apply only law, and must abide by the
Constitution, or they cease to be civil courts and become instruments of military policy.’”
Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *33.
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internment). As Judge Forrest explained, “[a]ny period of detention (let alone
years) for what could be an unconstitutional exercise of authority, finds no basis in
the Constitution.” Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *31.
Third, Judge Forrest appropriately subjected §1021(b)(2) to heightened
scrutiny because it impinges on the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to free speech
and due process. Id. at *35. She emphasized that the court must subject a national
security measure treading on these rights to “exacting scrutiny and ask whether it is
‘actually necessary’ to achieve those interests.” Id. at *38 (quoting United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012)). Discharging the court’s obligation of
“watchful care,” Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124, Judge Forrest refused to blindly accept
the government’s arguments and instead closely interrogated the basis for the
government action. See, e.g., Hedges, 2012 WL 399839, at *27 (“Simply by
asserting that §1021 is a reaffirmation of the AUMF does not make it so.”).
Thus, rather than simply accepting the government’s unsupported claim that
plaintiffs lacked standing, Judge Forrest searched for evidentiary support for the
claim that they had no reasonable fear that their actions would subject them to
detention. Id. at *12-13. However, “[t]he Government did not submit any evidence
in support of its positions.” Id. at *6. The government, she explained, could have
offered evidence, if available, that no one had been detained for engaging in First
Amendment activities, as well as evidence on how enforcement decisions were
27
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made under §1021(b)(2), including how the phrases “substantial support,” “direct
support,” and “associated forces” were interpreted. Id. at *12. The court, however,
would neither assume what the “Government’s evidence would have been,” nor
accept its “ipse dixit that plaintiffs’ fears of detention were unreasonable.” Id. at
*12-13. Nor could Judge Forrest accept the government’s mere promise that
plaintiffs would not be subject to indefinite detention. Id. at *28, *36.
Similarly, Judge Forrest probed the language of §1021(b)(2), pressing for
the practical meaning and application of key terms, including “associated forces,”
“substantially supported,” and “directly supported,” but the Government was
unable to define these terms. Id. at *2, *26, *43. When pressed on whether
plaintiffs could be detained under §1021(b)(2), the government first could not say
whether plaintiffs were subject to detention, id. at *36, and later stated that they
would not be if certain criteria were met, id. at *1, *2-3, *11, *27. These
responses, Judge Forrest concluded, were insufficient; neither provided assurance
that the statute would not penalize First Amendment activities. Id. at *1, *28.
Finally, Judge Forrest correctly concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to
injunctive relief, explaining that the due deference the courts must give the
political branches on national security matters did not relieve the judicial
obligation to determine whether §1021(b)(2) unconstitutionally violated plaintiffs’
rights. Id. at *5. In granting injunctive relief, she therefore declined to defer to the
28
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government’s argument that plaintiffs faced no imminent threat of detention
because it said so. Id. at *12.
CONCLUSION
Amici respectfully urge this court to affirm Judge Forrest’s exacting scrutiny
and ultimate permanent injunction. Through this heightened review, Judge Forrest
wisely heeded the lessons of history and correctly discharged the judiciary’s
constitutional duty of “watchful care.”
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